



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

Chile Project (#S199900030)

EXCISE

U.S. Department of State

Release _____ Excise ☒ Deny _____ August 26, 1975Declassify: In Part ☒ In Full _____Exemption(s) B3 NR

SUBJECT: ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting 25 August 1975

PARTICIPANTS: ARA - Acting Assistant Secretary Ryan,
Mr. William Luers; CIA - [] INR/DDC - Francis De Tarr **B3**Chile: Colonel Contreras' Current Visit to the U.S.

The meeting was called to discuss the current visit to Washington of Colonel Manuel Contreras, the Director of Chile's Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), and to provide talking points for a meeting that General Walters was to have with Colonel Contreras later in the day. A copy of the talking points, "Chile and Human Rights," given by Ambassador Ryan to [] is attached. **B3**
(A detailed description of a previous visit to Washington by Colonel Contreras was provided in the Notes for the ARA/CIA Meeting of July 11.)

[] said that General Walters would be seeing Colonel Contreras at lunch. Colonel Contreras was also going to New York where he would be checking advice that the Chilean mission had given counseling against a visit by Pinochet to the UN. Mr. Luers expressed the view that in our conversations with the Chileans we should not take a position on whether or not Pinochet should come. Ambassador Ryan said that we should play it very cautiously, and do nothing to encourage such a visit. **B3**

[] remarked that Pinochet has unfortunate advisors, and that Contreras is one of them. Noting that DINA was founded after the revolution, he said that Pinochet had handpicked Contreras to lead it. Pinochet had told this to General Walters on the latter's first visit to Chile after the revolution. He mentioned three others, including General Willoughby, who were also bad news. It would be **B3**

UNCLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

Dept of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir

() Classify as (✓) Extend as (S) Downgrade to

Date 2/1/01 Declassify on _____ Reason 25X/

B4 C6

00008636

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

2

good if they could all be replaced. Ambassador Ryan added one more to the list, a former deputy, and noted that the question of human rights is the main problem.

[] said that the economic medicine that is being applied in Chile is also a major problem. B3

Ambassador Ryan expressed the view that the Christian Democrats are whistling in the dark if they really are expecting a return to influence by the political parties.

[] said that, in any case, the Christian Democrats could not come back with their old leaders from the past. B3

Mr. Luers noted Frei's idea that military officers from the lower economic classes might try to turn to a Peruvian-type populist government. [] said that false analogies were being made. Ambassador Ryan agreed. B3

~~SECRET~~

Francis De Tarr
Francis De Tarr
- INR/DDC

NR

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

CHILE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Talking Points

Background

In general, detentions continue seemingly unabated and the procedural safeguards and amparo aspects of the new National Security Law are not being observed. Related happenings are:

- circumstantial evidence points to GOC involvement in the "missing 119";
- an academic purge appears on the way; over 44 were arrested in the University of Chile; 8 were fired at the Catolica;
- Pinochet has not recanted on his withdrawal of an invitation to the UN Working Group to investigate human rights practices in Chile. The Group is likely to issue a highly critical report. This may lead to a strong effort to withhold Chilean credentials at the forthcoming UNGA;
- the official number of political detainees has gone up;
- purported GOC official documents are circulating in Washington; they contain quotes from Chilean academic officials ordering burning of books.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

The Congress is very likely to go to the mat with us and:

- continue restrictions in FY 76 on military assistance and sales to Chile;
- curtail economic assistance, including our substantial food program. This program eases the BOP problem and reaches their agricultural areas, principal GOC objectives.
- obstruct our ability to reschedule Chile's foreign debt; result, even less available dollars.

What Have We Done for Them Lately

- Going ahead on an FY 75 \$15 million loan for agriculture coops and \$5 million for nutrition.
- Rescheduled USG loans for those payments due in 1975; we are prepared to do the same in 1976.
- Recommenced disbursement of \$9 million in old loans iced during Allende.
- Authorized AID guarantees on low-cost housing totaling \$55 million.
- Provided \$57.8 million in FY 75 Title I wheat; a similar amount is considered for FY 76.
- Donated over \$4 million for nutrition.
- Have just made available \$9.4 million in previous military credits not used before for various reasons.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

Talking Points

- The GOC has the opportunity to undercut the critical campaign against it by an early announcement regarding liberalization of certain aspects of its internal security operations.
- With the same aim, the GOC could give a demonstration that it intends to implement the new national security law, particularly amparo and some civilian court review of military tribunals.
- Another opportunity is open to it, given the willingness of the Working Group to receive official GOC testimony, to have a more balanced Group report. While we recognize the GOC's disinclination to "legitimize" the activities of the Working Group, a report without Chilean input would be harmful to the GOC.
- The GOC said it had only "postponed" the Working Group visit. By so doing it lost some moral and political advantage it had in previously welcoming such visits. It would be helpful if the GOC could convey the notion in advance of the UNGA that it might be possible several months from now to arrange for a visit of the Working Group.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

-- The U.S. executive branch has been forthcoming with the Pinochet government. We would like to continue this, particularly in those areas of immediate economic and military concern to Pinochet. Indications are that the U.S. Congress is interested in an objective report on current Chilean human rights practices. And, unless the Congress can see some improvement, the Executive will have a hard time opposing expanded restrictions on our collaboration with Chile.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

August 22, 1975